The Suspension of Belief

Is it always necessary to suspend one’s beliefs in order to critically and objectively study from an academic point of view? Are we not all influenced by our beliefs, whether they are religious or not, when we approach our subjects? Is it better to use an insider or outsider approach to the study of religion? Or is there an alternative?

Since I am not an ethnographer nor am I able to use participant observation in any of my research I was initially quite stumped at how I was going to write about anything relevant to this week’s readings. In a discussion with Emily, she helped me to see some of the connections between my work and the writings of Simon Coleman. One of the methodological issues which I think is prevalent throughout religious studies was one which we did not discuss much this year, the insider-outsider approach.

Since it has been something which I have wrestled with this year, and since this is the final blog I might as well bring it to the table. To put it bluntly, which is better? Insider or Outsider? Or is there another way?

Coleman writes about his ethnographic research with the “Word of Life Foundation” in Sweden. He questions the relationship between fieldworkers and their objects of study by pointing out that there appears to be a two-way relationship between participant and observer. In reference to the “Word of Life” community, he writes that “in certain respects, their activities seem surprisingly similar to those of secular anthropologists…they have prompted me to wonder about the nature and direction of mimesis in my fieldwork: Who, in other words, has been mimicking who?” (But are they Really Christian, 78).

I think that Coleman is turning the very question about the insider-outsider debate on its head. He asks: “must we continue to assume that there is a fundamental divide between “the field” and “home”?” (But are they Really Christian, 78). This divide is what the entire insider-outsider debate is hinged upon. If there were not a sense of us versus them, the debate would essentially become irrelevant.

A different approach to using the insider-outsider is only possible if we are able to go beyond our desire to see ourselves in a one-way relationship with our object(s) of research. A one-way relationship would be distancing oneself from the object in a way that ensures that they may analyze and transmit this information away from their object. In fieldwork, this would be properly representing a group objectively by creating a divide (not literally, but in a personal sense) between oneself and their subjects. I think that by acknowledging a two-way relationship, one in which both the subjects influence the observer and the observer gathers data on the subjects is an alternative to the insider-outsider approach. This new approach, which is suggested in Coleman’s article attacks the notion of “the ethnographic myth that the places and people we study are bounded, self-contained, and incapable of their own reflexive responses to multiple discourses” (86).

By understanding better the relationship between the participant and observer (or text and interpreter/ translator) it is not necessary to suspend one’s beliefs when analyzing a particular religious group/text/movement/etc. Rather, it is important to see how the subjects and objects of study may have influenced the observer. Coleman wrote in his conclusion that he sees that his own writings are not easily divorceable from the “self-constitution of the Word of Life” (86). I think that this is very insightful. I think that oftentimes Academia is premised upon a set of hierarchical “rules” whereby an academic views themselves as superior to their object of study or the religion to which their group of study ascribes themselves to. I think that Coleman’s idea about the relationship between participant and observer and his acknowledgment of the influence from the ‘Word of Life’ community is a better way of understanding this relationship.

Reflections on Method and Theory

Throughout this semester I wrestled with the value in studying methods and theories pertaining to the entire study of religion. There were several weeks where I felt that even though the topics were interesting they had no relevance for my particular focus within the study of religion. While being informed of the broader methodological discussions within the field was useful in our classroom discussions I wondered how this knowledge would help me as a scholar.

A moment of clarity came when I was able to use some of our classroom discussions on methodology in another class I was taking within my area of study. It was a class about genre and the classification of texts. I had an “aha” moment when suddenly we were having a discussion about modern categories imposed on ancient texts. This resonated with our discussion of the problems of classifications found in the readings of Masuzawa, Smith and van Voorst. I think that the ability to take the themes and questions from this class on method and theory and to be able to see them used (or not used) within my particular field is the most valuable thing I learned this semester.

While I did not find all of the classroom discussions useful for ancient textual studies, it was interesting to see the broadness of the field of religious studies and how my classmates were able to use them in a meaningful way. I think that one of the challenges of a class like ours is the same challenge of defining the term ‘religion’. Our class as a whole represented over 2000 years of history and covered a large geographical area (all over the world), as well as drew in knowledge from many other disciplines including anthropology, sociology, women’s studies, psychology and philosophy. Each of us had different approaches and studied different subjects (people, rituals, texts, etc). With such a variety of interests and backgrounds I am actually surprised that we had so much in common! Just like the word “religion” is difficult to define, I think that to make a class which is useful for students with such diverse interests is quite a difficult endeavor.

In regards to my own intellectual personality, I think that I am starting to get a sense of where I fit into discussions of scholarship in the study of religion. While I am hesitant to make any conclusions about my particular methodological beliefs, attitudes or proclivities (mostly because I think that I still have so much more to learn!) I do see how they would greatly affect my work as a scholar of religion. I see the study of religion, especially in relation to the study of texts, as being a bit outdated in its approach. The term ‘religion’ still carries with it a lot of baggage which I think still plagues its critical study.

The study of canon and the classification of literature is a very important topic for my research project. The discovery of ancient medieval texts from the Cairo Geniza in 1895 (An ancient Jewish storehouse) and the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1947 gave way to a flood of literature from antiquity and the early medieval period which opened a window into how texts and religious experiences were understood during that critical time in history when the biblical canon was being formed. When scholars first looked through this wealth of material they were often too haste in their classifications and categorizations of these texts. As a result there is a now a sense within my field that some of these categories do not accurately reflect the literature in question. There is also an idea that our very categories are not even useful in this study. Thus, I see myself as critically re-examining texts and deconstructing some of the preconceived ideas that went into the classification of this literature. I hope to be able to acknowledging the work that has been done in the past but “go beyond” it as Post was able to do in his paper about Hobsbawm.

One topic that I would have liked to discuss further was the insider-outsider approach to the study of religion. We are all influenced by religion in some way and it is important that we talk about how we are to use our influences in our studies. I think that this would have been a very useful discussion especially studying at the university of Toronto, being a university that has religious roots but is now a secular institution.

In regards to the structure of this entire course, I liked that we began with a discussion on methodology and then moved into a discussion on religion and religious studies. By covering different terms we were able to break down different aspects of the study of religion as a whole entity. I liked this way of navigating through the study of religion, however I think that perhaps it would have been useful to see the bigger picture from the beginning. I felt as though I was stumbling through this class, not knowing entirely what I was doing until now when I reflect back on the course. Perhaps at the beginning we could have laid out more of what we were doing and how we were going to navigate through the material. I also really like how we are ending. It is helpful to have a wrap-up class, where we discuss the overall picture.

I think that the greatest thing about this class was meeting others who had some of the same questions I did about the study of religion. Through discussion with those whose studies were also religious in nature though quite different than my own I was able to better understand the uniqueness of my own research questions within my field. Thanks to all of you who helped me this semester, either in person or in the virtual world. You enabled me to think and re-think my formulations and refine my research interests and gain a better appreciation for the study of religion as a whole.

The Tradition of the Red Cup

A Holiday Tradition
I had a conversation the other day with several friends about traditions and rituals that happen during the holiday season. One of these rituals was that of the starbucks cup. My friend explained that she had several “friends” who take part in the yearly ritual of Starbuck’s “switching of the cup”. This ritual, for them, involved getting up early and going to Starbucks on a particular day in order to be the first customers to receive the holiday inspired red cups (apparently this day is November 10th FYI). While I personally had noticed the different cups during this season, I had not really given much thought to when this change takes place. I was baffled by the idea that there are those who actually plan their days around being one of the first ones to get these cups. When doing some further research on this ritual I found this quote from the president of Starbucks:

"The holidays at Starbucks are all about enjoying traditions and connecting with friends and family," said Jim Alling, president of Starbucks North America. "For our customers, that means gathering at their local Starbucks coffeehouse to connect over a hot cup of Starbucks(R) Christmas Blend coffee in our signature red cups to savor the warmth, magic and reprieve that are found there during the holidays."

Of course when he mentioned the word “tradition” I perked up and then decided to share this tradition in my blog entry this week. Has Starbucks itself become a tradition?! If the “switching of the cup” is a ritual, it is a ritual within the tradition enjoyed by Starbucks customers involving the gathering at local coffeehouses and drinking the Coffee Christmas blend in a holiday inspired red cup. Is it a tradition?

What is Tradition?
Tradition is a very vague and a difficult word to define. Similar to the words “ritual”, “emotion” and “religion”, tradition is slippery in its definition. I think that one of the biggest issues surrounding its definition is that most scholars understand traditions as constantly changing. They are not static moments in time, rather they reflect changes within a particular culture/society/religion and often have the ability to adapt to these changes. This is often difficult to account for when seeking to define tradition. One of the most important elements in a tradition is the fact that it is grounded in history giving the tradition legitimacy in its practice. Paul Post writes about the tradition of Gregorian Chant music CD of the monks in Northern Spain and the growing popularity of their CD as international bestselling music. He writes that these “authentic” chants are really not that authentic, first of all this CD borrows traditional music sounds from old recordings from the 1970s and 80s, and secondly the term “Gregorian” has little to do with “Gregory” the name of which it has been associated with. He uses this as the prime example of what Hobsbawm labeled as “invented tradition” (Post, 39).

Hobsbawm defines an “invented tradition” as one which is a “set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm, 1). He further explains that it is not custom or routine (3) but it is a “process of formalization and ritualization” (4). I like the idea of an invented tradition in this sense, however the term itself can be problematic within the study of religion. Using the word “invented” can conjure up ideas about fabrication and illegitimacy. Post reads Hobsbawm’s Invented tradition as a concept not a term. He seeks to reflect deeper upon this concept in order to get beyond the superficial issues of artificiality and manipulation which plague “invented traditions” (Post, 44-45). His paper thus lays out the different ways of approaching this concept, using a variety of studies and methods.

The Cup
I am not really sure how the cup fits into the readings this week except that it represents a tradition for some Starbucks customers. It amazes me how Starbucks was able to create this tradition and that it has caused quite a stir (for some people). I think that one of the reasons why it has become a tradition is through its connection to the tradition of Christmas. By giving it a history (through association with Christmas and the holiday season) and by extension all the feelings and emotions and activities which accompany the holidays, Starbucks was able to make the “switch to the red cup” a holiday tradition. It is in this way that Starbucks has “invented” tradition.

The Emotional Side of the Study of Religion?

Can you imagine how might you productively apply an analysis of emotion to your own research?

Preliminary Thoughts:
I can truly say that before this week I had never heard of scholarly discussions connecting the words emotion and religion. I think that it is because of my preconceived ideas about the word emotion, and that as a scholar it is less reliable to study emotions than studying empirical evidence. As a result I tend to think of emotion and religion as two separate spheres of study. I am not entirely sure where my ideas about emotion were conceived, but I think that my training in history and historical methods have had a large impact. In my studies I tend to focus more on the provenance of a text; the date of composition, the source/authorship, and the way in which a text borrows/incorporates motifs and themes from other literature. By focusing on these aspects of a text I have largely ignored the idea of emotion in my studies.

What is Emotion?:
The study of emotion is a recent development in the field of religious studies. Corrigan writes that it came about as a reaction against the analytical model proposed by thinkers such as Emile Durkheim (5). The analytical model they proposed focused on the investigation of sources, causes and explanations of religion, and had no interest in the study of emotion. Since then scholarship has moved from using an analytical approach towards a deeper appreciation of the value of emotion in both modern and ancient cultures.

But what is emotion? It is a difficult term to define and for many scholars it remains inexplainable (6). Corrigan does not lay out a single all-encompassing definition, but somehow manages to elude the issue by explaining around the term. He does this by pointing out the origins of the study of emotion and some of the problems which it presents. The closest he comes to a definition is when he describes emotion and religion as a new center for which aspects of religion (ritual, authority, community, ideas, etc.) can be studied with the intention of disclosing “meanings previously hidden” (25). Thus, emotion is a lens through which we can seek to understand religious acts.

Problems:
One of the problems of studying emotion is the danger of universalism. In the article by Elliot R. Wolfson, he writes about extreme weeping as a characteristic Kabbalist spiritual practice. It is through this experience of intense emotional fervor which an individual can receive “revelatory experiences or mystical illumination” (Wolfson, 272). By doing a study focusing on emotions modern readers could inevitably draw connections between the weeping of the Kabbalists and modern expressions of weeping. While this could add understanding to the Kabbalists’ weeping, it could also diminish the value of their weeping. If we wanted to understand the significance of the weeping we should first seek to place it within its historical period and compare the different emotional experiences of that time. If we simply compare their weeping to modern conceptions of weeping we could undervalue or overvalue the importance of that emotional fervor as a religious experience. (Again, my emphasis on a historical approach creeps up)

Corrigan mentions in his introduction, “the study of religion, is steeped in issues of definition, questions about reductivity, and debate about the role of emotion in cultures” (7). I thought about this as I was reading through some of the articles and concluded that the term “emotion” is really no better than the term “religion”. It seems like emotion is used as a way of trying to get away from some of the stigma associated with the term religion. Not only is it vague, but it seems to be very subjective and thus could easily fall prey to the same discussions and scholarly biases which have plagued the study of religion.

I also took issue with the broadness of the term emotion. I read through several articles and they were all so completely different! I found it very difficult to draw connections between them. For example, the article by Shuger looked at philosophy and rhetoric and makes the argument that belief was grounded in emotion. This was quite different from Basu’s article about the Sufi saints and their emotional associations with cultural ideas and concepts. The differences between the articles highlights the different ways in which emotion can be studied.

Concluding Thoughts:
In conclusion, I think that emotion is something that has value to its study, but as with any methodology, it is important to use a variety of methods to access information rather than focusing on a single method. I don’t think that emotion is a strong methodology which is able to stand on its own. Although I do agree with Corrigan that it helps us as scholars access material and information that other approaches do not reveal. I do not think that I would ever write that my methodology was the study of emotion, although perhaps it would be an aspect of a certain methodology which I would adopt.

TEXT vs. ACTION: The Great Debate between Textual Scholars and Performance Theorists

What’s wrong with the hermenuetical stance and agenda of the textual scholar?

There are two main difficulties scholars must account for when attempting to study religions. The first is the definition of religion and the second, which stems from the first, is how to understand religions as continuously changing and adjusting to the economic, social and political events. Earlier this semester we discussed the definition of religion and the different baggage which is consciously or unconsciously carried within this term. I do not wish to re-define Religion, partly because I am not entirely sure how, however I would like to address the second related issue being the changing of religious experience.

There is no religion that has remained static and has not in some way adjusted to new ideas, cultural change or political influence. The question of how to study a religion that is constantly changing (or has gone through a variety of changes in the past) is one of the questions that is addressed by performance theorists. As an example I will use Judaism. If you look at Judaism in antiquity and compare it to Medieval Judaism or even to Modern Judaism, you would see that Jewish communities from different periods understood themselves in very different ways and perhaps they would not even recognize each other as belonging to the same faith tradition. All these different variations of Judaism used the Torah. A hermeneutical approach would understand their community in light of the Torah and emphasize that the way to understand their community was the way in which the Torah was interpreted, while a scholar ascribing to performance theory would try to understand the rituals and the human actions that made up their various forms of Judaism. (Note: I hope that I do not offend when I refer to different “variations” of Judaism, I do not mean to be disrespectful I just want to differentiate between different periods, the same could be done for any religion). I use this example to outline the different ways to approach religion.

Furthermore another question is which aspects of religion should be studied? Is it the “scripture” which teaches the religion (advocated by hermenutics), or is it the religious “rituals” or perhaps it is the feelings and emotions which are experienced by the participants in the religious tradition. Catherine Bell writes that the language of performance theory is a counter-approach to the one advocated by the “scholarly tendency to approach religious activity as if it were either a type of scriptural text to be analyzed or the mere physical execution of a preexisting ideology” (Bell, 207). Performance theory, as she advocates, is a way of going beyond a textual analysis to try and “decode action as action” (Bell, 206). She would argue against Paul Ricoeur that text metaphors as a way of understanding religions is not a satisfactory way to study religions.

The main problem with the hermenutical and text-focused approach is that it imposes a limit upon studying a religion. Returning to the point I was making about religions as constantly changing, if we looked solely at a single aspect of a religion, for example a sacred text, we could easily use this text as our guidebook to the religion, even if many of the elements contained within that text are not used or thought of as important to that particular culture. Bell writes that the performance approach in religious studies stresses “the execution of a preexisting script for activity…or the explicitly unscripted dimensions of an activity in process” (Bell, 205-6). The focus therefore is upon the action, the “doing” if you will, rather than the guidebook for the action.

Final Thoughts:
While I liked the problematization of the hermeneutical approach, a problem which I had with the emphasis on performance was that it is almost impossible to use when looking at ancient religions. I study ancient Judaism and one of the difficulties which I face in my studies is trying to understand how the Jews living within a Hellenistic world understood themselves as Jews. While there are some texts which refer to specific rituals, and even some archaeological evidence which suggests certain religious rituals and experiences were being done, there is little to be known for certain. I think that performance theory does have an important role to play in shifting the focus from texts (mostly referring to written texts) towards experiences and acts, however I think that each scholar must choose whether or not this approach is possible or even valuable for one’s research on a case by case basis.

The Implied Spider

I would like to address the question of the value of comparative work and whether Doniger convinces me of its value.

I would answer “yes” and “no”. On the one hand I think that comparative work does have value in the study of myths, however I do not agree that this is inherent or that it is the only way that myths ought to be studied. I would like to first examine Wendy Doniger’s definition of Myth and then discuss the history of comparison as a method and the problems associated with the method.

The Definition
As soon as I opened up this book I wondered how Doniger was going to define Myth. I have done some studies in the past on myth and in my experience it is always a difficult term to describe. It is first important to clarify the term “myth” which carries a certain connotation in popular culture (for example: “myth busters”) and secondly to differentiate myths from folklores, legends and similar literary genres.
Based on her introduction she has defined myth as:
- Not a lie or false statement
- A story that raises religious questions
- Sacred and shared
- Something that can be analyzed both narrowly and broadly
- Expresses cross-cultural experiences
- Being comparable between cultures

She acknowledges that the history of the term “myth” makes it a difficult word to define and study but nonetheless believes that the comparative approach is the best method to understand myths. While I agree with a cross-cultural examination, it is also important to look at a text within itself and within the particular context in which it was written (or spoken) and the context in which it was received. I think that by simply comparing a myth based on shared or different elements can be problematic. In theory I think it works, but in reality I think that it can be very subjective. I will explain further. When one does a comparative approach they look at similar and different elements between the two things being compared, however the criteria that is noticed can be biased and could give the impression that these myths were of a similar origin or could be different variations of the same story. Here again I believe we can run into the problem of classification and the dangers of categorizing, which we have discussed in previous classes.

A New Comparative Approach
In chapter 2 of Wendy Doniger’s book The Implied Spider she argues that “myth is an inherently comparative genre”. She advocates the idea that comparison is not only a useful method of studying myths but as one of the most basic ways we come to understand our world it is the most useful way to understand myths. I liked how Doniger used both a vertical analysis and a horizontal analysis of myth. Not only can myths be understood vertically (earthly & divine) but can also be understood in their relation with other myths (cross-cultural). It is useful to understand the dynamics of myths and that they can be understood in different ways and on different levels.

There are three different problems that Doniger mentions about the comparative approach, they lack rigor, they advance unfalsifiable universalist hypotheses and that they are politically unhealthy (64). These are the reasons why she writes that the universalist comparative studies have largely been abandoned in postmodern studies. I would like to respond to her first point as it struck me when I read it. In her response to the lack of rigor she presents a new model for comparison, one which insists upon a comparatist having the necessary background knowledge of the primary language and an awareness of the necessary context. I think that she is being too idealistic in her response to this model. While in theory this would be ideal, in practice who would be able to regulate this? While I agree that it is important to know the context of the particular myth or myths which are being studied, the context of many myths are highly debatable.

In Conclusion:
I personally agree with Doniger that the comparative approach is a useful method for the modern study of myths. However, I am hesitant to disregard the opposite approach. By focusing on a particular culture within a particular context one can understand the value of certain beliefs and ideas about the world, ideas which may not be as central to another culture who has their own myth. I think that the most important approach when looking at myths is to try to understand their reception rather than their origin. If a cross cultural comparative approach helps to understand this better then I would say that this would be the best method to undertake.

Issues of Gender

I have chosen to discuss Butler’s analysis of Wittig’s call for a “destruction of sex” in Boyarin’s article on “Gender”.

Butler vs. Wittig: The Battle of the Sexes?
Wittig has some very strong ideas about gender and female sexuality. She strongly ascribes to the ideas of Simone de Beauvoir who asserts that women are not born women, rather they become women through sexual intercourse. It is through this act that a women is produced and becomes set into her role as a women. In other words Wittig views the role of women as socially constructed through a women’s role as a wife and mother. The idea that “one is not born a women” is similar to those from the writings of Philo of Alexandria and Paul from the early Jewish and early Christian periods.

As a method of eliminating this extremely hegemonic construction, Wittig calls for a “destruction of sex” as the only way to “liberate” this class of people from their socially constructed roles (126). She believes that the only ones who are not reduced to the role of women are lesbians and nuns. Her main purpose is to allow women to assume the status of universal subjects through the destruction of “sex” (126).

Butler’s points out that Wittig’s notion of women and when they become women is predicated upon the assumptions of “masculinist ideologies of transcendence” (126). He also criticizes that she associates the pregendered individual with freedom. By claiming this assumption Wittig subscribes to the very categorization of sex as natural that she is trying to disprove and deconstruct.

I would agree with Butler in saying that by making this claim Wittig is ascribing to the same ideologies which existed in the times of Philo and Paul in that women who did not get married and remained virgins were not considered women, but rather were viewed as men. This is predicated upon the assumption that there remains a higher, more desirable class. It also reinforces hegemonic ideas about gender and male-female relations. Butler clearly argues from the other extreme from Wittig when he defines gender as “the discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established as “pre-discursive”, prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts” (117). For Butler “sex” is a natural phenomenon which is developed before culture and provides a starting point for which culture is built upon.

What do we do now?
How are we as scholars to approach our research with this in mind? This was a question about which I have pondered as I always seek to understand the purpose behind what it is that I am studying. Here are some of the reasons for which the study of gender and the question of “sex” as pre-social or not are of relevance.

1. Characteristics of gender are deeply ingrained into our thinking as scholars. Even in today’s society there are activities, clothes, games and colours that are generally ascribed to a particular gender (blue=boys, pink=girls, as an example). As a result it is important that as scholars we are careful to approach our subjects by not imposing our views of gender upon our subjects, whether they be texts or people.

2. The status of marriage. In North America marriage is not as valued as it was in Israel in the first century (to use an example). In those days it was absolutely necessary to be married in order to continue one’s family line. For women the raising of children was often considered their most important role and therefore being able to provide for one’s family was a key feature in choosing a husband.

3. Gender and class. In the ancient world these were closely related. Women could not achieve the same class as men unless they “became men” (refer here to the examples given in Boyarin about women who became highly praised in society).

Can Anything Exist Pre-socially?
As I conclusion I would like to state my personal views on the question on the existence of anything presocial. I believe that there are certain things that we are born with although often these are reinforced through culture and our navigation through society as we grow up and learn. For example, humans are born with the ability to communicate through language, whether it be speech, hand gestures, facial expressions, etc. This is a universal phenomenon which is presocial. However, as we grow we learn new and different ways of communication. The best example of this is to watch a newborn baby develop into a toddler. Babies already know how to communicate from birth. However from birth to their school years they makes incredible strides in their ability to learn different modes of communication. This shows that while culture/society does produce communication, it is also an innate human quality.

I also think that the notion of sex is presocial, however that being said it is also socially constructed. Sex (and by this I mean the ability to distinguish between male and female) is something that we are born with, however the hegemonic idea that the male is superior to the female is socially contructed. Gender roles, on the other hand, are not presocial, but socially constructed.

If this blog entry seemed a bit chaotic and scattered it is because it is a reflection on my mind this particular week. I have a particular interest in women’s studies, but sometimes have trouble with different theorists’ application to my own field of study. The final question which I will end with is one which I do not yet have a clear formulation for but have been thinking about in light of some of my interests.

How do my personal views on gender relations and the determination of sex as a pre or post social phenomenon affect how I will conduct my research?